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Summary 
Climate Policy Needs to Overcome the Win-Lose Narrative 
One key reason for the slow pace of climate policy is that it is based on a win-lose narrative: 
either economic development wins or climate protection. Climate policy will never get where it 
needs to be going if this narrative of pain and sacrifice is not overcome. It is in our view indeed 
deeply flawed for various reasons: 
First, maintaining the current energy system is hardly cheap and will tend to become ever more 
expensive in the future. Already today the world’s countries each year spend trillions of dollars 
on fossil fuel subsidies and imports. Second, a high share of the necessary reductions can be 
achieved at a net economic benefit through energy efficiency. Third, the economics of 
renewable energy-based energy provision are changing rapidly. Renewables are already cost-
competitive in various settings and the rapid decline of equipment costs through technological 
progress and increasing market penetration continues. Wind and solar will probably be fully 
competitive in most of the world by the end of the decade. Fourth, in addition to the global 
climate externality fossil fuel use also causes substantial local externalities, such as local air, 
water and land pollution, which have to be borne by the public and need to be taken into 
account in cost-benefit analyses. Fifth, the discussion about risks of carbon leakage is rather 
disproportionate to the share of national emissions that is actually at risk, and the risk decreases 
further the more efforts to tackle the climate problem pick up speed globally. 
The problem is hence not so much the macro-economic outlook. The problem is that climate 
policy is effectively economic policy with substantial distributional impacts and thus naturally 
engenders resistance. Those who stand to lose from the low-emission transition have so far 
managed to dominate the narrative while the innovation impulses and new markets created by 
climate policy have so far not received adequate attention. 
Parties Should Explore Different Types of Commitments 
Arguably, a key factor in the framing of the narrative is how commitments are framed. We 
recommend to reconsider the political wisdom of the quantity-based approach that climate 
policy has so far been based on. As long as emissions are seen as inextricably linked to 
economic well-being, framing commitments in terms of emission reductions directly triggers 
the perspective of seeing climate protection as an economic loss. In addition, quantity 
commitments are equivalent to giving countries money. These two factors directly give rise to 
the distributional controversy that has dominated the climate negotiations. Moreover, adopting 
quantity commitments is risky for governments as key emission drivers such as economic and 
population growth are largely beyond their influence. The prevalence of fears that quantity 
commitments may become a “cap on development” is hence not surprising. Finally, quantity 
commitments constitute not only a minimum but also the maximum emission reduction and 
adjusting commitments once they have been set has proven to be nearly impossible. 
We therefore recommend to explore other types of commitments that do not trigger fears of 
imposing a “cap on development” and that are more in line with what governments can actually 
deliver: implementing policies. 
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Direct emission pricing is economically equivalent to cap-and-trade. Cap-and-trade induces an 
emission price, and taxing emissions at that price would reduce emissions to that cap. But direct 
emission pricing does not have many of the drawbacks of emission caps. It does not create a 
new commodity to be distributed and contrary to emission reductions emission pricing is 
directly implemented by governments, thus entailing much less risk for governments to not be 
able to meet their commitments. As there would be no hard emissions cap, fears of a “cap on 
development” might also be lower. Moreover, due to the political influence of loser interests 
actual mitigation costs can be expected to be lower than the figures political discussions are 
based on. In such a situation, direct emission pricing will deliver higher emission reductions 
than expected, rather than surplus allowances that create difficulties for future commitment 
periods.  
However, direct emission pricing does share one core problem of emission caps, that it is seen 
as an economic burden and not directly in the national interest. A further limitation is that, 
irrespective of the level of ambition, emission pricing, be it via emission trading or taxation, is 
no silver bullet as climate-friendly investments are impeded by a variety of non-economic 
barriers.  
We therefore recommend a multi-dimensional approach to commitments. Countries should be 
encouraged to complement emission (pricing) commitments with other types of commitments 
that may dovetail more directly with what is seen as being in the national interest, such as 
scaling up certain climate-friendly technologies or improving energy efficiency. Experience 
suggests that the sum of such sector or technology specific commitments may well often be 
more ambitious than the respective country’s overall emission (pricing) commitment. 
Experience also seems to indicate that overachieving clean energy targets is often seen as a 
prompt for doing more, while overachieving emission targets is seen as an invitation to rest on 
one’s laurels. 
The strongest mobilisation of political support might perhaps be achieved by framing 
commitments as a joint international undertaking to provide universal access to sustainable 
energy services by a specific date, as such an undertaking would be fully aligned with the 
aspirations of many governments and people.  
Evaluation of the experience from implementing concrete actions based on systematic 
monitoring should contribute to shifting opinions about the feasibility of climate protection and 
thus allow knowledge-based adoption of ever more ambitious commitments step by step. 
Revisit and Improve 
Commitments should be reviewed regularly after they have been adopted. However, the history 
of the UNFCCC suggests that reviews are only taken seriously if they are coupled with the 
expiration dates of commitments. Therefore, commitment periods should not be longer than five 
years as in the first Kyoto period. Moreover, five years is compatible with the time horizon of 
most policy-makers. Commitments that are due longer into the future are quickly seen as 
somebody else’s problem. 
Climate Mainstreaming and Outreach 
In addition, to make climate protection fully part and parcel of all government decisions, all 
countries, with possible exceptions for Least Developed Countries and other poor countries to 
be identified through certain criteria, should commit to adopting comprehensive zero-emission 
development strategies (ZEDS) covering all sectors. ZEDS should be grounded in a strategic 
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vision to fully phase out fossil fuel use by 2050. In addition, governments should include 
climate damages into the shadow pricing procedure when deciding on infrastructure 
investments and government procurement. 
As for involving non-state actors, Parties could explore the possibility of inviting such actors to 
make their own pledges under the 2015 agreement or in a parallel document or register. Parties 
might also explore the possibility of fast-tracking such pledges for support from the Green 
Climate Fund or from domestic resources. However, such actions by non-state actors can only 
be a facilitator of, not be a substitute for ambitious government action, as all of these actions 
will count towards national commitments. 
Criteria for Differentiation 
Departing from the quantity-based approach would substantially recast the effort sharing 
discussion, as it would be no longer be about how to share the globally necessary reductions or 
a global emissions budget. If commitments are framed in different terms, it would have to be 
explored to what extent differentiation indicators that have so far been discussed would also be 
relevant for determining levels of ambition for these new types of commitments. 
Negotiation Process 
One reason for the failure of the Copenhagen summit was maybe that the undertaking was too 
broad, trying to simultaneously develop new architectures for mitigation, adaptation, finance, 
technology cooperation and capacity building. The task for the 2015 agreement could arguably 
be made easier by limiting it from the outset to top-level items and delegating implementation 
details to COP decisions. The key top-level items are in our view mitigation commitments, 
financial commitments, and common accounting. As regards finance, the climate regime should 
ideally be made self-financing through emission pricing instruments. In addition, climate 
change needs to be mainstreamed into all public finance flows, including official development 
assistance, export promotion etc.  
In terms of negotiation process, Parties should define clear milestones to be achieved at the 
2013 and 2014 COPs. Initial offers for commitments should be put on the table by countries in 
2014 already in order to allow review by the international community and subsequent 
strengthening in case the initial offers fall short of the required level of ambition. 
A full draft of the new agreement should be on the table at the 2015 intersessional at the latest. 
Political leaders should be involved much more closely than so far and much earlier than in the 
Copenhagen process. As climate policy is effectively economic policy with strong distributional 
impacts, these impacts need to be judged by heads of state and government. Delegates will not 
be able to work out the high-level items if they do not have high-level guidance as a basis.  
The negotiations could also benefit from stronger involvement of stakeholders, who so far play 
only a marginal role. A possible model is provided by FAO’s Committee on World Food 
Security, the world’s highest-level body on global food security policy, where constituencies 
have essentially equal standing to Parties, except for the right to vote. 
Need for Stronger EU Action 
The EU could inject additional momentum into the international negotiations by adjusting its 
commitments to current realities. The EU has almost achieved its 20% target domestically. 
Taking into account offset credits surrendered in the EU ETS, the EU in 2012 even reduced 
emissions by the equivalent of 27% of its 1990 emissions. 
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In addition, the EU or individual member states should take up other sector-specific initiatives 
with countries which share common interests. One possible example is the “Renewables Club” 
recently formed by China, Denmark, France, Germany, India, Morocco, South Africa, Tonga, 
the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the International Renewable Energy 
Agency (IRENA), though the details still need to be fleshed out.  
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Preface: Fundamentals First: Climate Policy 
Needs to Overcome the Win-Lose Narrative 
Climate policy in general and the UNFCCC climate negotiations in particular are being 
conducted by most participants in a win-lose mindset: Either we protect the climate, but 
then we will have to shoulder an economic burden. Or we put the economy first, but 
then we get severe climate change. Being able to use fossil fuels is seen by most as 
indispensable for economic well-being. Statements by world leaders frequently boil 
down to a belief that reducing emissions sharply would mean losing industry and jobs, 
have negative impacts on living standards and would amount to limiting “development 
space.”1  
Former UNFCCC Executive Secretary Yvo de Boer reportedly identified the lack of 
confidence in the viability of low-emission development as key factor behind the failure 
of Copenhagen to deliver the hoped-for agreement.2 If this is the case, climate policy 
will never get where it needs to be going unless the fundamental narrative is changed. 
We consider that the win-lose narrative is indeed deeply flawed for a number of reasons 
and instead subscribe to the view that, “Thorough analysis shows that the current world 
energy system (and with it the entire, fossil fuel-based world economy) is situated in a 
“local sub-optimum” – as a sled is stuck in a local hollow, which is separated from a 
deep valley (the “global optimum”) only by a short and relatively gently rising slope. If 
one exerts a minor extra effort to push the sled across the slope, the vehicle can get 
moving rapidly! The energy transition needs exactly this push from governments – in 
the long term the extra-investment will pay off double, triple and manifold.”3 
First, maintenance of the current energy system is far from cheap and will tend to 
become ever more expensive in the future. According to a recent study by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the world each year spends trillions of dollars on 
energy subsidies, which mostly benefit fossil fuel use. The IMF puts the value of the 
subsidies at 0.7% of world GDP on a pre-tax and 2.5% of world GDP on a post-tax 
basis. And while the purported objective of these subsidies is to help with energy access 
of the poor, according to the IMF, most of the benefits are actually captured by higher-
income households. Just removing these subsidies could according to the IMF reduce 
CO2 emissions by 13%.4 The recent World Energy Outlook special report on climate 
                                                
1 See e.g. a collection of statements in Moomaw, William; Papa, Mihaela (2012): “Creating a mutual gains 
climate regime through universal clean energy services”, in: Climate Policy, Vol. 12, No. 4, pp. 505-
520. 
2 Quoted in: Murray, James (2012): Doha: Loss and damage in the desert - 10 Dec 2012. 
http://www.businessgreen.com/bg/james-blog/2230841/doha-loss-and-damage-in-the-desert, last 
accessed 24 June 2013. 
3 Rahmstorf, Stefan / Schellnhuber, Hans Joachim (2006). Der Klimawandel. Diagnose, Prognose, 
Therapie. München: Beck, p. 114, translated from the original Germany by the authors. 
4 International Monetary Fund (2013): Energy Subsidy Reform: Lessons and Implications. January 28, 
2013. http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/012813.pdf, last accessed 24 June 2013. 
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change by the International Energy Agency (IEA) complements that global fossil fuel 
subsidies are six times the level of support received by renewable energy technologies 
and that 15% of global CO2 emissions effectively receive an incentive of US$110 per 
tonne through fossil-fuel subsidies.5 
The EU each year spends around €400 billon on fossil fuel imports, which corresponds 
to around 3% of the EU’s GDP. The International Energy Agency’s chief economist 
Fatih Birol has commented that this is “the equivalent of a Greek crisis – every year“.6 
Second, in the mid-term a large share of the necessary emission reductions can be 
achieved at a net economic benefit through efficiency improvements. For instance, a 
study conducted by the Wuppertal Institute in cooperation with German utility E.On 
concluded that in Germany about 160 Mt CO2-eq. of annual emission reductions could 
be achieved through efficiency improvements within ten years, and out of these about 
120 Mt CO2-eq. at a net economic benefit.7 120 Mt CO2-eq. corresponds to about 10% 
of Germany’s 1990 emissions. Regarding the EU, Fraunhofer ISI concluded that overall 
final energy demand could be reduced by 57% compared to the baseline projection by 
2050, resulting in annual cost savings of about €500 billion (in year-2005-euro).8 
Regarding the global level, the IEA for the 2012 WEO developed an “Efficient World 
Scenario” that is based on doing no more than exploiting energy efficiency 
opportunities which justify themselves economically in terms of rates of return and 
payback periods but are not being utilised due to a variety of barriers. According to the 
IEA, mobilising this potential through appropriate policies to remove these barriers 
would result in a global emission trajectory that up to 2020 would be nearly identical 
with the IEA’s 450 Scenario, which represents a trajectory that would lead to a 
stabilisation of atmospheric GHG concentrations at 450 ppm CO2-eq. The Efficient 
World Scenario would lead to a peak of energy-related CO2 emissions before 2020, and 
even up to 2035 implementation of the Efficient World Scenario would take the world 
nearly halfway to the 450 Scenario. 
                                                
5 IEA (2013): Redrawing the Energy-Climate Map. World Energy Outlook Special Report. Paris: 
OECD/IEA. www.worldenergyoutlook.org/energyclimatemap, last accessed 24 June 2013. 
6 Quoted in: The Guardian: Overseas aid to Africa being outweighed by hefty costs of importing oil, 1 April 
2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/apr/01/overseas-aid-africa-oil-imports-
costs?newsfeed=true, last accessed 24 June 2013. 
7 Barthel, Claus et al. (2006): Optionen und Potenziale für Endenergieeffizienz und 
Energiedienstleistungen. Kurzfassung. Wuppertal: Wuppertal Institut für Klima, Umwelt, Energie. 
http://wupperinst.org/uploads/tx_wupperinst/EE_EDL_Kurzfassung.pdf, last accessed 24 June 2013. 
8 Boßmann, Tobias; Eichhammer, Wolfgang; Elsland, Rainer (2012): Concrete Paths of the European 
Union to the 2°C Scenario: Achieving the Climate Protection Targets of the EU by 2050 through 
Structural Change, Energy Savings and Energy Efficiency Technologies. Accompanying scientific 
report – Contribution of energy efficiency measures to climate protection within the European Union 
until 2050. Karlsruhe: Fraunhofer ISI. http://www.isi.fraunhofer.de/isi-en/e/projekte/bmu_eu-energy-
roadmap_315192_ei.php, last accessed 25 June 2013. 
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Figure 1: Energy-related CO2 emissions in the 2012 WEO’s Current Policies, New Policies, 
Efficient World and 450 Scenarios9 
According to the IEA, the Efficient World Scenario would result in a more efficient 
allocation of resources, boosting cumulative economic output through 2035 by US$18 
trillion, with a 0.4% higher global GDP in 2035 than in the New Policies Scenario, 
which reflects current and announced policies. Additional investment of $11.8 trillion in 
more efficient end-use technologies would be needed, but this would be more than 
offset by a US$17.5 trillion reduction in fuel expenditures and US$5.9 trillion lower 
supply-side investment. One may also not that the scenario mainly considers 
incremental changes to the technologies and practices used, but not more holistic 
concepts, such as prioritising energy efficiency at all levels of urban planning, or 
lifestyle changes. 
Third, the picture on the energy provision side is changing rapidly. According to the 
IPCC’s Special Report on Renewable Energy, renewables are already cost-competitive 
in various settings.10 And the economics continue to improve rapidly through 
technological progress and increasing market penetration. Equipment costs of solar 
photovoltaics (PV) have fallen by about 80% within the last five years. Wind turbine 
costs have fallen by 29% in the same timeframe even though starting from a much 
lower level.11 A recent report by GTM Research notes that 2009 industry roadmaps 
were targeting US$1.00/W module costs as a medium-term goal, while in fact best-in-
class Chinese producers are now already approaching costs of US$0.50/W. The report 
projects that solar PV module costs will fall further to US$0.36 per watt by the end of 
2017.12 McKinsey has similarly projected that solar PV costs will continue to fall by as 
much as 10% annually by 2020.13 A recent report by Citigroup projects that both wind 
                                                
9 IEA (2012): World Energy Outlook 2012. Paris: OECD/IEA, p. 318. 
10 IPCC (2011): IPCC Special Report on Renewable Energy Sources and Climate Change Mitigation. 
Prepared by Working Group III of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [O. Edenhofer, R. 
Pichs-Madruga, Y. Sokona, K. Seyboth, P. Matschoss, S. Kadner, T. Zwickel, P. Eickemeier, G. 
Hansen, S. Schlömer, C. von Stechow (eds)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United 
Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1075 pp. 
11 Liebreich, Michael (2013): Keynote. Bloomberg New Energy Finance Climate Summit. 23 April 2013. 
http://bnef.folioshack.com/document/summit2013/1czp7t, last accessed 25 June 2013.  
12 Mehta, Shyam (2013): PV Technology and Cost Outlook, 2013-2017. GTM Research. 
http://www.greentechmedia.com/research/report/pv-technology-and-cost-outlook-2013-2017, last 
accessed 25 June 2013. 
13 Aanesen, Krister; Heck, Stefan; Pinner, Dickon  (2012): Solar power: Darkest before dawn. 
McKinsey&Company. 
http://www.mckinsey.com/client_service/sustainability/latest_thinking/solar_powers_next_shining, last 
accessed 25 June 2013. 
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and solar will be fully competitive with other energy sources in most parts of the 
world.14 
While some point to renewables’ need for backup, which entails additional costs, total 
energy-related expenditures in a renewables-based energy system are also expected to 
become lower than those of a fossil-based system in the not too distant future. The 
German Reference Study (Leitstudie), which analysed the impacts of the Energy 
Concept adopted by the German government, projects that total energy expenditures in 
a system based on efficiency and renewables, as foreseen in the German Energy 
Concept, will fall below those in a fossil-based energy system around 2025. The 
balance of higher upfront investments and subsequent savings is projected to turn 
positive around 2030, with cumulative savings amounting to around 570 billion Euros 
by 2050. Taking into account climate damages, the balance would turn positive around 
2020 already.15 
Figure 2: Total energy expenditure of all consumers with exclusively fossil provision of current 
energy consumption levels (grey line), with implementation of the German Energy Concept’s 
efficiency targets (green line), and for the renewables-dominated energy mix as aimed for in 
the German government’s Energy Concept (red line).16 
                                                
14 Channell, Jason; Lam, Timothy; Pourreza, Shahriar (2012): Shale & renewables: a symbiotic 
relationship. Citi Research. 
https://ir.citi.com/586mD+JRxPXd2OOZC6jt0ZhijqcxXiPTw4Ha0Q9dAjUW0gFnCIUTTA==, last 
accessed 25 June 2013. 
15 Nitsch, Joachim et al. (2013): Langfristszenarien und Strategien für den Ausbau der erneuerbaren 
Energien in Deutschland bei Berücksichtigung der Entwicklung in Europa und global. Schlussbericht. 
Stuttgart, Kassel, Teltwo: Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt (DLR), Fraunhofer Institut für 
Windenergie und Energiesystemtechnik (IWES), Ingenieurbüro für neue Energien (IFNE). 
16 ibid., S. 32. 
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Fourth, in addition to the global climate externality fossil fuel use also causes 
substantial local externalities that have to be borne by the public, such as local air, water 
and land pollution. Climate change is far from the only problem the world has with its 
current fossil-based energy system. According to analysis by the European 
Commission, a domestic EU emission reduction of 30% by 2020 would reduce annual 
health damages by €7.3-16.7bln and air pollution control costs by €5.3bln.17 
Fifth, much of the discussion is being dominated by fears of carbon leakage. The 
question is, however, what percentage of EU emissions is actually exposed to this risk? 
Is transport – which according to Eurostat accounts for around 32% of final energy use 
in the EU18 – going to be relocated to other countries if the EU pursues stringent climate 
policy and other countries do not? Are households, which account for another 27%, 
going to be relocated? Are power plants, waste, agriculture and forestry? And even in 
industry, most sectors are either not emission intensive or not strongly exposed to 
international competition.19 Nevertheless, overall climate ambition is being substantially 
held back by concern about a rather minor share of overall emissions.  
 
The problem is hence not so much the macroeconomic outlook. The above-mentioned 
finding that energy subsidies mostly benefit wealthy rather than poor households points 
to where the problem lies: Climate policy is essentially economic policy and will have 
substantial distributional impacts. While at the macro level the benefits will be 
substantial even without taking into account climate damages, at the micro level there 
will be losers as well as winners, which naturally engenders resistance. Companies and 
entire sectors that have so far based their business models on the use of fossil fuels will 
either have to fundamentally restructure, or be replaced by others that provide the same 
societal service in a low-emission manner. According to the recent IEA special report, 
net revenues for existing nuclear and renewables-based power plants would be boosted 
by US$1.8 trillion (in year-2011 dollars) through to 2035 under in the 450 Scenario, 
while the revenues from existing coal-fired plants would decline by a similar level. 8% 
of new fossil-fuelled plants would be retired before their investment is fully recovered.20 
Pursuing a 2°C compatible climate policy would also amount to effectively 
expropriating the majority of global fossil fuel reserves. According to the IEA and 
others, at least 2/3 of global fossil fuel reserves will need to remain untouched if the 
2°C target is to be met. However, these reserves are already on companies’ books. 
Analysis by HSBC concluded that if adequate policies to achieve the 2°C target were 
                                                
17 European Commission (2010): Commission staff working document. Analysis of options to move 
beyond 20% greenhouse gas emission reductions and assessing the risk of carbon leakage, 
Background information and analysis, Part II. Brussels, 26.5.2010, SEC(2010) 650.  
18 Eurostat: Consumption of energy, 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Consumption_of_energy, last accessed 
24 June 2013. 
19 See e.g., Graichen, Verena; Schumacher, Katja, Matthes, Felix Chr.; Mohr, Lennart; Duscha, Vicky; 
Schleich, Joachim; Diekmann, Jochen (2008): Impacts of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme on the 
industrial competitiveness in Germany. Dessau-Roßlau: Federal Environment Agency 
(Umweltbundesamt). 
20 Ibid. 
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introduced, this could strip as much as 60% of the market value off fossil fuel 
companies.21  
Those who stand to lose from the low-carbon transition have so far managed to 
dominate the political narrative while the innovation impulses and new markets created 
by climate policy have so far not received adequate attention. This narrative will need to 
be turned from its head on its feet if climate policy is ever to get where it needs to be 
going. 
We consider that a key factor in the framing of the narrative is how commitments are 
framed. 
                                                
21 HSBC (2013), Oil & carbon revisited, Value at risk from unburnable reserves, 
http://gofossilfree.org/files/2013/02/HSBCOilJan13.pdf 
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Response to Consultation Questions 
Question 1: How can the 2015 Agreement be designed to 
ensure that countries can pursue sustainable economic 
development while encouraging them to do their equitable 
and fair share in reducing global GHG emissions so that 
global emissions are put on a pathway that allows us to 
meet the below 2°C objective? How can we avoid a repeat 
of the current situation where there is a gap between 
voluntary pledges and the reductions that are required to 
keep global temperature increase below 2° C? 
Question 2: How can the 2015 Agreement best ensure the 
contribution of all major economies and sectors and 
minimise the potential risk of carbon leakage between 
highly competitive economies? 
A Quantity-Based Approach Has Serious Drawbacks 
One of the main reasons why the international negotiations have been so difficult is 
arguably that commitments and actions have so far usually been conceived of in terms 
of emission reduction targets. This may be called a very “scientific” approach. As 
climate change is caused by the accumulation of greenhouse gas emissions in the 
atmosphere, it was concluded that policy should put a cap on emissions and ratchet that 
cap down over time. And ideally use this cap as a basis for an emission trading system, 
which would put a price on emissions and thus drive investments and innovation into 
low-emission alternatives. 
However, as long as emissions are seen as inextricably linked to economic well-being, 
framing commitments in terms of emission reductions directly triggers the perspective 
of seeing climate protection as an economic loss. In addition, turning the Earth’s GHG 
absorption capacity into a new commodity inevitably gives rise to controversy about 
who should receive what share of this commodity. Quantitative commitments are 
contentious because they are equivalent to giving countries money.22  
Moreover, quantitative emission commitments do not only mandate a minimum 
emission reduction, they at the same time also mandate the maximum emission 
reduction. If a country or company overachieves its target, this yields no benefit to the 
atmosphere. Instead, the overachievement yields a surplus of emission allowances, 
which others can buy to offset their above-target emissions. Which is the stated point of 
the system, as it gives those who can easily reduce their emissions an incentive to do so 
                                                
22 Stiglitz, Joseph E. (2006): Making Globalization Work. New York / London: W W Norton & Co. 
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while reducing the costs for those who are not able to easily reduce their emissions. But 
this becomes a problem when emission reductions turn out to be more easy than 
expected (as the history of environmental regulations has shown to usually be the case) 
or if a recession causes emissions to be drastically lower than expected. 
And while in theory this problem could easily be solved by making the commitments 
more stringent, in practice it has turned out to be rather difficult to adjust emission 
targets once they have been set. 
The theoretical advantage of quantity commitments, that they provide certainty on the 
environmental outcome, therefore loses much of their luster as in practice it has turned 
out to be near-impossible to set commitments at the level where they would need to be 
set, or indeed to set any commitments at all. 
Most governments evidently do not have the necessary confidence that they will 
actually be able to control emissions to the extent required. National emissions are 
strongly influenced by factors such as economic and population growth, which 
governments can at best influence indirectly, if at all. In addition, technology choices 
are in many cases not under the control of national policy. One of the best examples is 
the energy efficiency of cars, which is decided on in the headquarters of the production 
centres, in the USA, Europe, Japan, South Korea and (perhaps) China – all other 
countries are “takers” of such of decisions. Furthermore, as noted above, the ability to 
emit GHGs is seen by many as crucial precondition for the ability to develop. This is 
especially pertinent for the rapidly industrialising countries. Rapid industrialisation and 
urbanisation is in itself a challenge for reducing emissions. In addition, future emission 
levels are much more difficult to forecast in rapidly growing economies than in less 
rapidly growing ones. 
Most countries evidently first need to convince themselves and their public that 
flourishing economically while forsaking fossil fuel use is actually possible. Climate 
policy should therefore explore other types of commitments that do not trigger fears of 
imposing a “cap on development” and that are more in line with what governments can 
actually deliver: implement policies. 
Exploring Alternative Types of Commitments 
Emission taxation is economically equivalent to emission trading. Cap-and-trade 
induces an emission price, and taxing emissions at that price would reduce emissions to 
that cap. However, emission price commitments may have several strategic advantages. 
They would not turn emissions into a commodity to be distributed among countries. 
Contrary to emission reductions, emission pricing is directly implemented by 
governments, thus entailing much less risk for governments to not be able to meet their 
commitments. Instead of committing to a certain economic output governments would 
commit to a certain input. As there would be no hard emissions cap, fears of a “cap on 
development” might also be lower. Moreover, due to the political influence of loser 
interests actual mitigation costs can be expected to be lower than the figures political 
discussions are based on. In such a situation, the emission price will deliver higher 
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emission reductions than expected, rather than surplus allowances that create difficulties 
for future commitment periods.  
Cramton, Ockenfels and Stoft suggest a global emission price commitment, which 
could directly achieve what is also the ultimate objective of emission trading, but which 
emission trading can achieve only indirectly: A uniform global emission price. Such, a 
global price commitment could eliminate the risk of leakage at one stroke. In terms of 
process, they suggest that each country would declare its highest acceptable carbon 
price. The lowest price that would be needed to cover a pre-defined share of global 
emissions would become the carbon price for all countries that sign up to the agreement. 
Developing countries would receive compensatory payments through the Green Climate 
Fund, but only participants in the pricing agreement would be eligible to participate in 
the GCF. This approach would create a level playing field while fully taking into 
account the argument of some countries that no Party would be willing to have other 
Parties dictate its contribution, as no country would be forced to commit to a higher 
price than it declared.23 
Emission price commitments would be fully compatible with domestic emission trading 
systems that already exist. While translating the price commitments directly through 
domestic carbon taxation would be the most straightforward approach, the price 
commitments could also be implemented through emissions trading with price 
management systems, such as a floor price. Concerns regarding the social and equity 
impacts of emission pricing could for example be addressed with a “feebate” approach, 
whereby a fee is applied to that which is supposed to be discouraged, in this case GHG 
emissions, and the revenues are used to pay for rebates on better alternatives. 
Alternatively, the revenues could be directly rebated to citizens on a per capita basis, 
which would have the effect that high emitters would be net payers while low emitters 
would be net recipients. 
However, emission taxation does share one core problem of emission caps, that it is 
seen as an economic burden and not directly in the national interest. Ambitious pricing 
commitments and in particular a global price commitment may well not be feasible 
politically in the short term. A fall-back option may be differentiated national or 
sectoral price commitments. 
A further limitation is that, irrespective of the level of ambition, emission pricing, be it 
via cap-and-trade or taxation, is not a silver bullet as climate-friendly investments are 
impeded by a variety of non-economic barriers, such as split incentives, e.g. the 
landlord-tenant problem, risk aversion against new technologies, lack of capacity and 
information, and others. If prices were the sole determinant of investments, the world 
would not dispose of gigatonnes of no-regret potential, as analysed by the IEA and 
others. Also, renewables would hardly have come down the learning curve as fast as 
they have if no dedicated support had been provided. 
                                                
23 Cramton, Peter; Ockenfels, Axel; Stoft, Steven (2013): How to Negotiate Ambitious Global Emissions 
Abatement. A Statement of Key Principles and an Explanatory Note. 
http://www.cramton.umd.edu/climate/files/2013/05/GCP-Project-statement-exlanatory-note.pdf. 
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We therefore recommend taking a multi-dimensional approach to commitments. 
Countries should be encouraged to complement emission (pricing) commitments with 
other types of commitments that may dovetail more directly with what is seen as being 
in the national interest, as long as these are shown to go significantly beyond business 
as usual. And as reducing emissions is a complex problem, it is an adequate approach to 
tackle it from as many different angles as possible. 
Commitments could for example be framed in terms of scaling up certain climate-
friendly technologies or improving energy efficiency. The EU itself provides a possible 
template with its 20-20-20 targets. Technology scale-up and energy efficiency 
improvements can be more directly influenced by government action than overall 
emissions and may dovetail with countries’ and citizens’ interests to promote certain 
technologies and energy security. The German shift to renewables is largely driven by 
private citizens, based on the enabling environment put in place with the German feed-
in tariff. Private citizens account for half of the installed renewable electricity capacity, 
more than 500 renewable energy cooperatives have been created over the last years and 
there are now 120 “100% renewable energy regions” aiming to become independent of 
fossil fuels.24 
Another possible type of commitment some countries might wish to adopt could be to 
limit fossil fuel extraction. Ecuador has made a proposal in this regard in its Yasuni 
initiative. As noted above, analysis by the IEA and others suggests that to achieve 2°C 
at least 2/3 of global fossil fuel reserves will need to be left untouched. But currently the 
same governments that are trying to reduce fossil fuel use are at the same time still 
promoting the maximum possible exploitation of fossil fuel reserves wherever they are 
found, from fracking and tar sands to frozen carbon hydrates on the ocean floor. 
As the EU example shows, multi-dimensional commitments might also often be more 
ambitious than mere emission (pricing) commitments. Achieving the EU’s renewable 
and energy efficiency targets would lead to emission reductions of 25% rather than only 
20%.25 China may offer a similar example. In addition to lowering its CO2 emissions 
per unit of GDP by 40–45% by 2020 compared with the 2005 level, it also pledged to 
increase the share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption to around 15% by 
2020. And according to analysts, the 15% non-fossil energy target is more ambitious 
than the emission intensity target.26 
In addition, experience seems to indicate that overachieving clean energy targets is 
often seen as a prompt for doing more, while overachieving emission targets is seen as 
an invitation to rest on one’s laurels. For example, the Chinese solar PV target for 2015 
                                                
24 Energiegenossenschaften investieren 800 Millionen Euro in Energiewende, 
http://www.solarwirtschaft.de/presse-mediathek/pressemeldungen/pressemeldungen-im-
detail/news/energiegenossenschaften-investieren-800-millionen-euro-in-energiewende.html; 100ee-
Map: 100%-EE-Regionen, http://www.100-ee.de/index.php?id=100eemap, last accessed 25 June 
2013.  
25 European Commission (2011): Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions. A 
Roadmap for moving to a competitive low carbon economy in 2050. Brussels, 8.3.2011 COM(2011) 
112 final. 
26 China – Developing countries – Climate Action Tracker, 
http://climateactiontracker.org/countries/china.html, last accessed 24 June 2013. 
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was initially set to 5GW and then raised to 10GW, 15GW, 21GW and finally 35GW, 
with 10GW to be installed in 2013 alone.27 In Germany, while at federal level the 
renewable target in the power system has been left untouched in the post-Fukushima 
realignment of energy policy, remaining at 35% in 2020 and 50% in 2030, the federal 
states (Länder) have developed ambitions far beyond, which has resulted in aims (and 
probable developments) of 40% in 2020 and 72% in 2030. We experience here a 
dynamic competition between “member states” in the multilevel state Germany. If the 
same conditions would prevail at EU level, the pioneering approach by Germany could 
result in an upwards competition between EU member states. The same has to be 
allowed to unfold at UN level. 
Another example of escalating targets is Denmark, which will oblige its energy energy 
network or distribution companies to save 2.4 percent of final energy each year from 
2015 onwards. 
 
Figure 3: Development of Danish energy-saving targets of energy network or distribution 
companies from 2005 (electricity only) to 2020 (electricity, gas, district heat and heating oil)28 
The strongest mobilisation of political support might be achieved by framing 
commitments as a joint international undertaking to provide universal access to 
sustainable energy services by a specific date, as such an undertaking would be fully 
aligned with the aspirations of many governments and people.29 A key divide in climate 
policy is that industrialised countries see climate change from the environmental 
perspective while developing countries see it from the development perspective. It is in 
fact in both cases a development issue, as industrialised countries need to fundamentally 
re-develop their energy systems. 
                                                
27 Parkinson, Giles (2013): Solar Insights: China lifts PV target to 35GW. 
http://reneweconomy.com.au/2013/solar-insights-china-lifts-pv-target-to-35gw-10104, last accessed 25 
June 2013. 
28 Source: Ea Energianalyse, NIRAS and Viegand & Maagøe (2012): Evaluering af energiselskabernes 
energispareaktiviteter (in Danish). www.bigee.net/s/chuz82, last accessed 24 June 2013. 
29 Moomaw, William; Papa, Mihaela (2012): “Creating a mutual gains climate regime through universal 
clean energy services”, in: Climate Policy, Vol. 12, No. 4, pp. 505-520. 
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Evaluation of the experience from implementing concrete actions based on systematic 
monitoring should contribute to shifting opinions about the feasibility of climate 
protection and thus allow knowledge-based adoption of ever more ambitious 
commitments step by step. 
As for assuring sufficient global ambition, initial offers should be put on the table by 
countries in 2014 already in order to allow review by the international community and 
subsequent strengthening in case the initial offers fall short of the required level of 
ambition. 
Other Barriers to Universal Participation 
In terms of Realpolitik a crucial barrier to universal participation is the requirement for 
a 2/3 majority in the US Senate to ratify international treaties. It does currently not seem 
likely that such a majority could be reached in the foreseeable future. It could therefore 
be useful to explore possibilities for non-Parties to participate in the 2015 agreement, 
for example on the basis of legally binding national legislation. The 2015 agreement 
might define minimum criteria for non-Party participation, including robust accounting 
and MRV standards. Access to agreement benefits such as carbon markets or 
technology cooperation could also be made contingent on meeting such criteria.  
Revisit and Improve 
In addition, commitments should also be reviewed regularly after they have been 
adopted. We share the view expressed in the Commission consultation that the 2015 
agreement may not fully complete the task of setting the world on a 2°C pathway. In 
addition, given the rapidly declining costs of renewable energy technologies, the world 
in 2020 may look very different from the world in 2015. At the same time, the findings 
from climate science are becoming ever more alarming by the year. 
International climate policy therefore needs to be designed so as to be able to react  
flexibly to new opportunities and new scientific findings. The agreement should 
therefore include regular reviews of ambition levels.  
However, the history of the UNFCCC suggests that reviews are only taken seriously if 
they are coupled with the expiration dates of commitments. The review of adequacy 
foreseen in Art. 9 UNFCCC has so far been an empty shell.  
Therefore, commitment periods should not be longer than five years as in the first 
Kyoto period. Lengthening commitment periods could lock the world into a long-term 
trajectory not compatible with preventing dangerous climate change. Moreover, five 
years is compatible with the time horizon of most policy-makers. Commitments that are 
due longer into the future are quickly seen as somebody else’s problem.  
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Question 3: How can the 2015 Agreement most effectively 
encourage the mainstreaming of climate change in all 
relevant policy areas? How can it encourage 
complementary processes and initiatives, including those 
carried out by non-state actors? 
Making commitments multi-dimensional as suggested above, by inviting countries to 
make sector- and technology specific commitments in addition to emission (pricing) 
commitments, could in our view strongly contribute to mainstreaming climate change in 
other policy areas. 
In addition, to make climate protection fully part and parcel of all government 
decisions, all countries, with possible exceptions for Least Developed Countries and 
other poor countries to be identified through certain criteria (see answer to question 4), 
should commit to adopting comprehensive zero-emission development strategies 
(ZEDS) covering all sectors at least two years prior to the start of each new 
commitment period. To ensure that the ZEDS have a level of ambition sufficient to 
meeting the country’s obligations, they should be submitted to an international review.  
• ZEDS should be grounded in a strategic vision to fully phase out fossil fuel use 
by 2050.  
• ZEDS should be organised by sectors and subdivided by greenhouse gas.  
• The ZEDS should set out a credible pathway to comply with commitments 
through mitigation actions that cover all sectors. This pathway should cover both 
medium-term goals, including the commitments for the next commitment period 
or periods as agreed in the 2015 agreement, as well as a long-term goal to fully 
phase out fossil fuel use by 2050. 
• Draft ZEDS for the period 2020-2025 should be submitted by the end of 2017 at 
the latest. 
The process for reviewing draft ZEDS could build on the procedures already in place 
for International Assessment and Review (IAR) and International Consultation and 
Analysis (ICA). 
• Where the review process finds that a ZEDS is not in line with meeting the 
global long-term target, the analysis should explore options to raise the level of 
ambition of the ZEDS.  
• The Conference of the Parties should review the results of the analysis and may 
decide to request countries to revise their ZEDS to ensure that they are 
consistent with meeting the global long-term target. 
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The implementation of ZEDS should be reported on regularly in the national 
communications and biennial reports/biennial update reports and also be reviewed in the 
IAR/ICA processes or their future replacements. ZEDS reporting should contain an 
obligatory assessment of long-term impacts, including environmental and social 
integrity. Focusing attention and effort on the broader ZEDS context and long-term 
impacts would promote interlinkages with other policies /instruments in the countries.  
The theoretically most effective way of mainstreaming climate change would be to 
include the cost of climate change in any economic decision. This would require to 
generally correct market prices according to the cost of climate change. However, the 
huge distributional effects of this approach limit its feasibility. A second-best approach 
is to restrict the concept of having economic decisions guided by costs of climate 
change to investment decisions, especially those whose lifetime is beyond the time 
horizon of markets. Such decisions can by definition not be guided by market prices, 
and in practice they are in fact guided by indicators which are elaborated via different 
approaches. Long-term investments are mainly made in infrastructure, which is 
provided by various state agencies. In infrastructure planning in developing countries 
that is done on behalf of development agencies, the usual method of valuation in 
feasibility studies is to include damage costs into the shadow pricing procedure. The 
same method is recommended for any procurement decision by governments. For both 
types of government investment it is feasible to take the shadow price instead of the 
market prices as the basis for investment decisions, as the otherwise neglected external 
effects have to be paid by the inhabitants of the state. Hence this kind of decision-
making should not only apply to developing countries which need the support of 
international development banks. It should be generally recommended as standard 
governmental procedure as part of ZEDS, including in industrialised countries, as the 
rational of this procedure does also hold for them. One further benefit would be: In 
doing so, negative income effects for society as a whole as result of external effects 
could be avoided. 
As for non-state actors, Parties could explore the possibility of inviting such actors to 
make their own pledges under the 2015 agreement or in a parallel document or register. 
The spotlight afforded by such an approach might strongly contribute to receiving 
ambitious pledges and promoting subsequent implementation. Such non-state actions 
could also be regularly reviewed under the UNFCCC to check implementation and the 
potential for scaling up. 
Parties might also explore the possibility of fast-tracking such pledges for support from 
the Green Climate Fund or from domestic resources. Such an approach may be 
especially effective if coupled with sourcing international revenues for the GCF, such as 
emissions trading or levies on international aviation and shipping. According to the UN 
Secretary-General’s High-Level Advisory Group on Climate Financing (AGF), 2°C-
compatible pricing instrument for international aviation and shipping could yield dozens 
of billions of dollars of new revenues (see also answer to question 6). 
However, such actions by non-state actors cannot be a substitute for ambitious 
government action, as all of these actions will count towards national commitments. 
Rather, they should be seen as a means to fast-track action and give additional 
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momentum to implementation, hopefully leading to overachievement and subsequent 
strengthening of government commitments in the course of the international review 
process. 
Question 4: What criteria and principles should guide the 
determination of an equitable distribution of mitigation 
commitments of Parties to the 2015 Agreement along a 
spectrum of commitments that reflect national 
circumstances, are widely perceived as equitable and fair 
and that are collectively sufficient avoiding any shortfall in 
ambition? How can the 2015 Agreement capture particular 
opportunities with respect to specific sectors? 
Departing from quantity-based commitments would substantially recast the effort 
sharing discussion as it would be no longer be about how to share the globally 
necessary reductions or a global emissions budget. If commitments are framed in 
different terms, it would have to be explored to what extent differentiation indicators 
that have so far been discussed would also be relevant for determining levels of 
ambition for these new types of commitments. 
If the quantity-based approach is retained, the results of the “South-North Dialogue” 
may be of interest, which the Wuppertal Institute conducted in 2003-2006 with partners 
from 12 developed and developing countries. The outcome of the Dialogue was the 
“South-North Proposal” for how to differentiate among countries.30 In this proposal, 
differentiation is based on the following principles and indicators: 
Responsibility as a reflection of a Party’s contribution to the climate problem through 
historic and ongoing GHG emissions 
Indicators: Cumulative CO2-emissions per person since 1990. 1990 was chosen as it 
was the year of the first IPCC assessment report, which can be taken as the date from 
which policy should have tackled climate change as a matter of urgency.  
Capability as a reflection of a Party’s financial and socio-economic strength to help 
overcome the climate problem 
Indicators: GDP per person on a power-purchasing parity basis and Human 
Development Index rating 
                                                
30 South-North Dialogue: Equity in the Greenhouse. http://wupperinst.org/en/projects/details/wi/p/s/pd/45/, 
last accessed 25 June 2013.  
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Potential as a reflection of the mitigative opportunities within a Party’s economy to 
reduce or limit GHG emissions 
Indicators: Emission intensity (CO2 / GDP), GHG per capita and growth of emissions 
since 1990. 
The South-North proposal suggests three decision rules on this basis: 
 
As for capturing opportunities within certain sectors, we consider that the above 
recommendations to invite sector-specific commitments from countries, and to obligate 
countries to develop comprehensive ZEDS could have a strong impact in this regard.  
Question 6: What should be the future role of the Convention 
and specifically the 2015 Agreement in the decade up to 
2030 with respect to finance, market-based mechanisms 
and technology? How can existing experience be built 
upon and frameworks further improved? 
One reason for the failure of the Copenhagen summit was maybe that the undertaking 
was too broad, trying to simultaneously develop new architectures for mitigation, 
adaptation, finance, technology cooperation and capacity building. However, these 
architectures have subsequently been put in place through the Cancún and following 
agreements. There is now a bevy of new institutions which can be built on: the Green 
Climate Fund, the Standing Committee on Finance, the Technology Executive 
Committee, the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN), the Adaptation 
Committee and the Adaptation Framework. 
The task for the 2015 agreement could arguably be made easier by limiting it from the 
outset to top-level items and delegating implementation details to COP decisions. The 
key top-level items are in our view mitigation commitments, financial commitments, 
and common accounting. As regards finance, industrialised countries have so far 
pledged to scale up climate finance to $100 billion annually by 2020. The 2015 
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agreement will therefore need to contain commitments for the time after 2020. These 
commitments should be in line with scientific estimates of developing country needs 
related to achieving the ultimate objective of the Convention and related to adapting to 
the impacts of climate change and to address loss and damage. 
Ideally, the climate regime should be made self-financing through emission pricing 
instruments. According to analysis by the AGF, the revenue potential from these 
sources is substantial. Table 1 below summarizes the public revenues that according to 
the AGF could be derived from auctioning of emissions allowances in industrialised 
countries, levies on offsets and putting a carbon price and international shipping and 
aviation.  
 
Public Sources Revenue Potential  
(billion US$) 
CO2 Price (US$/t CO2-eq.) 10-15  20-25  50 
Auctioning of allowances (2-10% of estimated auctioning revenues 
dedicated to international climate finance) 
2-8 8-38 14-70 
Levies on offsets (levy of 2-10% of offset transactions) 0-1 1-5 3-15 
International maritime transport (no net incidence on developing 
countries, 25-50% dedicated to international climate finance) 
2-6 4-9 8-19 
International aviation (no net incidence on developing countries, 25-
50% dedicated to international climate finance) 
1-2 2-3 3-6 
Table 1: Potential Public Revenues from Carbon Market-Related Sources31 
Looking at the AGF assessment, it is noteworthy that the underlying assumptions are 
rather conservative. The AGF focuses its analysis on the medium-range carbon price 
(US$20-25/t CO2-eq.), which is not in line with achieving the 2°C target, and it 
assumes that only relatively low shares of revenues from carbon markets could be 
dedicated to international climate finance. If one assumes that mitigation commitments 
will hopefully at some point be brought in line with the 2°C target, which according to 
the AGF would lead to a carbon price of about US$50, and that revenues from 
international sources, in particular carbon-related sources in international transport, 
could be fully dedicated to climate finance, mobilizing US$100 billion and more does in 
fact appear as eminently viable. International aviation and shipping alone could provide 
as much as half of this amount and only a relatively minor share of 7% of the revenues 
of auctioning allowances in industrialized countries would be needed for the other half.  
In addition, climate change needs to be mainstreamed into all public finance flows, 
including official development assistance, export promotion etc.  
                                                
31 Adapted from Sterk, Wolfgang; Luhmann, Hans-Jochen; Mersmann, Florian (2011): How much is 100 
billion US Dollars?  Climate finance between adequacy and creative accounting. Berlin: Friedrich-
Ebert-Stiftung. http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/08158.pdf, last accessed 24 June 2013. 
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Question 7: How could the 2015 Agreement further improve 
transparency and accountability of countries 
internationally? To what extent will an accounting system 
have to be standardised globally? How should countries be 
held accountable when they fail to meet their 
commitments? 
Common accounting is a crucial ingredient for the 2015 agreement. The 
Copenhagen/Cancún pledges are characterised by a high level of uncertainty, the UNEP 
Emissions Gap Report therefore has no less than four scenarios of where global 
emissions might end up in 2020, based in the interpretation of the pledges. Therefore, 
all countries above a certain level of responsibility and capability as defined according 
to indicators such as those discussed for question 4 should agree to common emissions 
accounting based on the rules of the Kyoto Protocol. 
The need for adequate emissions accounting would not be obviated by framing 
commitments in other terms than emission targets, as suggested in response to questions 
1 and 2. Climate policy would still need to be judged on the basis of what progress is 
made towards the 1.5°C/2°C target. The lack of reliable data from many countries is a 
serious impediment in this regard. In addition, having a clear picture of how emissions 
are developing and what drives them is a core precondition for being able to develop 
appropriate mitigation actions. 
From a political science perspective, compliance with commitments is mostly not 
determined by the terms of the agreement but by a cost-benefit calculation to what 
extent meeting the commitment is seen as in the national interest and what would be the 
consequences of non-compliance, including consequences inside and outside the 
agreement. Taking a multi-dimensional approach to commitments, as suggested in 
response to questions 1 and 2, should contribute to countries seeing compliance as in 
their own interest. As for costs of non-compliance, no recalcitrant country will be 
dissuaded if even the purported champions of an agreement do not take steps to defend 
it where necessary. Canada was able to walk away from the Kyoto Protocol with 
impunity, there is no indication that the EU or others tried to exact any kind of price 
from Canada. 
Compliance could also be promoted by constituting strong privileges that would only be 
open to complying countries. One possible venue could be to establish a strong plank of 
international technology cooperation. 
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Question 8: How could the UN climate negotiating process be 
improved to better support reaching an inclusive, 
ambitious, effective and fair 2015 Agreement and ensuring 
its implementation? 
The negotiation process would probably benefit if majority voting was introduced as 
per the draft rules of procedure.  
The 2015 process should define clear milestones to be achieved at the 2013 and 2014 
COPs. A full draft of the new agreement should be on the table at the 2015 
intersessional at the latest. 
Political leaders should be involved much more closely than so far and much earlier 
than in the Copenhagen process. Climate policy is effectively economic policy with 
strong distributional impacts. These impacts need to be judged by heads of state and 
government. Delegates will not be able to work out the high-level items if they do not 
have high-level guidance as a basis. At the same time, heads of state and government 
should not be involved in the minutiae of the negotiations. The world leaders’ summit 
UN Secretary-General Ban-Ki Moon will convene in 2014 may provide a good format 
for giving high-level guidance but without getting bogged down in details. Another 
such summit should be held in 2015 to give further guidance for the final shape of the 
agreement. 
The negotiations could also benefit from stronger involvement of stakeholders, who 
so far play only a marginal role. A possible model is provided by FAO’s Committee on 
World Food Security, the world’s highest-level body on global food security policy, 
where constituencies have essentially equal standing to Parties, excepting the right to 
vote but including the right to intervene, join breakout discussions, and submit and 
present documents and formal proposals. 
As for having Conferences of the Parties (COPs) only every two years to prevent a 
series of disappointed public expectations, we consider that the public is fully justified 
in its demand for ambitious action, given the ever more alarming warnings from climate 
science. We consider that the problem is not the high level of public expectations, but 
the low level of the system’s problem-solving capacity. In addition, the COPs in our 
view play a crucial role in keeping the issue on the political agenda within countries. 
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Question 9: How can the EU best invest in and support 
processes and initiatives outside the Convention to pave 
the way for an ambitious and effective 2015 agreement? 
The EU could inject additional momentum into the international negotiations by 
adjusting its commitments to current realities. The EU has almost achieved its 20% 
target domestically. Taking into account offset credits surrendered in the EU ETS, the 
EU in 2012 even reduced emissions by the equivalent of 27% of its 1990 emissions.32 
The EU’s approach to international aviation in our view provides a best-practice 
example of how the EU can promote action outside the Convention. After more than a 
decade of stalemate within ICAO, the EU forced other countries to the table by adopting 
innovative legislation with extraterritorial application. If the current talks in ICAO fail, 
the EU should therefore revert to implementing its legislation as originally planned. The 
EU should also take the same approach to international shipping.  
In addition, the EU or individual member states should take up other sector-specific 
initiatives with countries which share common interests. One possible example is the 
“Renewables Club” recently formed by China, Denmark, France, Germany, India, 
Morocco, South Africa, Tonga, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the 
International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), though the details still need to be 
fleshed out. The World Resources Institute in a recent paper proposed some 
characteristics such “clubs” should have to actually provide added value: Notably, an 
ambitious vision, limiting membership to countries that are actually in line with that 
vision, providing significant real benefits to members and a pathway to start quickly and 
scale up over time.33 
                                                
32 Sandbag (2013): Europe risks going backwards on climate change unless emissions targets are 
increased, http://www.sandbag.org.uk/blog/2013/jun/10/europe-risks-going-backwards-climate-change-
unless/, last accessed 24 June 2013. 
33 Two Degrees Clubs: How Small Groups Of Countries Can Make A Big Difference On Climate Change, 
http://insights.wri.org/news/2012/10/two-degrees-clubs-how-small-groups-countries-can-make-big-
difference-climate-change.  
